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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the impact of 30 years of globalization on gender equity in well-being 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Data indicate that while some gaps in well-being 
have narrowed, progress is uneven across a set of nine indicators, and in some cases, 
conditions have worsened. Despite the optimism of market proponents, growth is not 
found to be an equalizer for gender anymore than it has been shown to be by class. The 
results here indicate that growth exhibits a negative effect on some indicators, while  
growth of real government expenditures, female share of the labor force, and structural 
change variables exert a positive effect.  
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THE GREAT EQUALIZER?: GLOBALIZATION EFFECTS ON GENDER 
EQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Globally, gender gaps in well-being remain pervasive. Proponents of 
globalization have argued that economic growth, facilitated by policies to liberalize 
investment, trade, and financial flows as well as to privatize industry and reduce public 
sector deficits, will have a differentially beneficial effect on gender equality. Competitive 
pressures in a globalized economy, it is argued, make women an attractive source of 
labor, given their relatively lower wages. In the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) 
region where there is greater gender equity in education relative to other regions of the 
developing world, globalization cum liberalization of markets then should bode well for 
women.  
Critics of globalization have argued that women are often disadvantaged in an 
economic process founded on liberalized trade, investment, and financial flows. This is 
related to the fact that the state’s role is often attenuated under such a policy regime, in 
part because the mobility of capital puts downward pressure on public spending, making 
it difficult to fund social spending and safety nets. Further, there is evidence that 
employment is increasingly insecure, and women are often slotted for the jobs with the 
least security. Finally, investment mobility is greatest in labor-intensive industries, where 
women are concentrated. Women are disadvantaged in efforts to bargain for higher 
wages, since firms can credibly threaten to relocate in such cases.  
To evaluate these competing hypotheses, I consider the case of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Economic performance in the region has varied widely over the last 30 
years. Most countries have taken significant steps to liberalize their economies, either 
voluntarily or due to pressure from international financial institutions in the context of 
structural adjustment. A consequent shift in economic structure is evident throughout the 
region, with growth of export demand contributing to an increase in manufacturing as a 
share of GDP in most countries. These industries tend to be female-intensive in 
employment.  
On the supply side, women in the region, already by 1970, ranked substantially 
above women from other developing regions in well-being, measured in terms of health 
and education (although they had less education than men). They did not, however, have 
equitable opportunities to earn income, and faced exclusion from positions of power in 
political and economic institutions. This region then is an interesting one in which to 
consider the effects of globalization, both because the moves toward liberalization have 
been substantial and because women had many of the prerequisites to participate in the 
paid economy as workers.  
To consider these issues, I begin first by reviewing the literature on gender and 
economic growth. I then develop a set of well-being indictors, using a Borda ranking 
methodology that facilitates comparisons across countries. Trends in well-being are 
assessed, and the effects of growth since 1970 on these trends are evaluated. Panel data 
analysis is also used to measure the impact of four categories of variables on trends in 
gender gaps in well-being—female bargaining power, structure of production, 
macroeconomic conditions, and government spending.   
 
II. GROWTH AND GENDER EQUITY 
Gender inequality in developing countries may be linked to the inadequacy of 
societies’ material resources. Females, it is often argued, are placed at the back of the 
queue, whether for food, health care, education or jobs, given that all of these are in short 
supply. We might therefore expect per capita income to be positively correlated with 
gender inequality, and indeed, several studies provide evidence to support this hypothesis 
(Dollar and Gatti 2001; World Bank 2001).1 As a result, economic growth is argued to be 
a key factor in promoting gender equity in well-being. If this holds, the thorny question 
of how to stimulate economic growth still remains. The debate can broadly be 
characterized as between those who argue for market liberalization against the view that 
the state plays an important role in moving economies up the industrial ladder to higher 
value-added production and in insuring a fair distribution of resources.2 
 Proponents of trade, investment, and financial liberalization, and privatization—
or succinctly, globalization—have argued that women, in particular, should benefit from 
a strategy that relies on economic openness and, in particular, exports as the engine of 
growth. This is because women are the preferred source of labor, owing to competitive 
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pressures firms face to keep unit labor costs low. Sustained demand for female labor 
should drive up female wages relative to those of men as labor markets tighten. Increased 
access to jobs and higher relative wages raise women’s incomes absolutely and 
indirectly, by increasing their bargaining power within the household to leverage a more 
equitable distribution of resources.  
Moreover, rapid growth, signaling rising per capita incomes, should generate 
more revenue for households to invest in female family members, closing the gender gap 
in well-being. This “income effect,” in the view of some, is not necessarily gender-
biased, since females’ lower future earnings make it rational to direct household 
investments to men when income is limited. By implication, this view suggests that 
economic growth will overcome the structural bias against females. Further, it is 
conceivable that economic growth generates increases in state-level resources that can be 
differentially allocated to females, thus improving their relative well-being during the 
process of growth. 
There is ample research, however, showing that the benefits of economic growth 
under the recent regime of globalization are not necessarily broadly shared—across class, 
ethnic, or gender groups (Milanovic 2002, Benería 2003). Numerous authors, for 
example, state that Latin America grew more slowly than Asia over the last three decades 
because the benefits of growth were not broadly shared, leading to political conflict that 
resulted in dysfunctional macroeconomic policy and ultimately, slower growth (Larraín 
and Vergara 1998).  
Using a human development approach, Ranis and Stewart (2002) find little 
evidence of beneficial effects of economic growth in LAC over the past four decades. 
They attribute the failure of growth to improve human development in the region to the 
disruptive effects of debt crisis and harsh structural adjustment programs that relied on 
excessive cuts in social expenditures. They find evidence, however, that growth 
combined with high social expenditures did promote growth in some countries in the 
region. It is precisely this latter component, however, which is compromised in the 
globalization process as state-level mechanisms to provide a safety net are inhibited 
through declining tax revenues, privatization of public sector social services, and slow 
growth induced by financial mobility effects on domestic interest rates.  
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Research in the area of gender and macroeconomics reveals that the effects of 
economic growth on women’s relative well-being differ, depending on how women’s 
labor and unpaid labor are affected by a country’s growth path, and by implication, the 
shifting economic structure. One thread of that work explores the ways in which the 
process of capital accumulation can lead firms to exploit women’s gender role, with 
women channeled into the most insecure jobs (Benería and Sen 1981; Elson and Pearson 
1981; Standing 1989; Hsiung 1996). For example, in Latin America, informal sector 
employment as a share of total non-agricultural employment has been rising since 1980, 
with 57% of jobs characterized as informal in the 1990s (Gatti and Kucera 2004). Almost 
half of all women work in the informal sector, and they are more likely than men to be in 
informal sector work (Charmes 2000).  
Although informal sector work is sometimes residual employment, in the Latin 
America region, Benería (2003) argues that the informal and formal sectors are linked 
through subcontracting. This strategy is compatible with gender norms, reflecting as it 
does, the “male breadwinner” bias in job allocation (Elson and Cagatay 2000). While this 
strategy enhances profits, it also undermines the benefits of increased demand for female 
labor since the lack of a job ladder and the tenuousness of these jobs hold down female 
wages. There is evidence that these tendencies have worsened during the recent period of 
globalization, which shifts economies from a wage-led to profit-led growth path, and in 
the process, leads to heightened competition.3  
The degree to which women benefit from liberalization-induced growth is also 
influenced by how the structure of the economy changes, coupled with patterns of job 
segregation. Years ago, Boserup (1970) argued that women are marginalized in this 
structural shift, due to technological change that favors men’s access to resources. While 
she referred primarily to the shift from agriculture to industrial production, her arguments 
continue to hold currency. Female labor absorption under insecure conditions of work is 
notable in semi-industrialized economies where labor-intensive manufacturing growth 
has been strong, and, to a lesser but growing extent, services (Standing 1989). In some 
countries, the growth of the services sector is a result of worsened conditions in the 
industrial sector, and its increase as a share of GDP reflects the growth of residual 
employment in the informal sector as workers are sloughed off from industrial sector 
with trade liberalization (Kempadoo 1999; Benería 2000; Charmes 2000). In other cases, 
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the expansion of the services sector is based on increased export demand for informatics 
services, reflecting a structural shift away from manufacturing or agriculture.4   
Whatever the determinants of services and manufacturing expansion as a share of 
GDP, these are female-intensive sectors (Standing 1989). This contrasts with country 
experiences in which resource- or capital-intensive manufacturing growth has provided a 
significant demand-side stimulus. In those cases, labor demand tends to be male- 
dominated. Examples of the latter are Trinidad and Tobago, where the petroleum industry 
dominates, and Taiwan, where the move up the industrial ladder has led to women’s 
marginalization in the manufacturing sector (Berik 2000). Most developing economies 
fall into the former category, where liberalization and other policies have led to the 
expansion of labor-intensive manufacturing and services.  
Do these structural shifts lead to improvements in women’s well-being? Some 
have argued that they are likely to because women’s access to employment increases, 
which can improve their bargaining power in the home. Lim (1990) and Kabeer (2000) 
emphasize this aspect of liberalization and export-oriented growth, arguing that women 
gain on net, while others (including Kabeer herself), note that women’s access to insecure 
work may have little effect on women’s “voice” within the household (see also Benería 
2003). The net effect on female relative well-being remains, however, an empirical 
question.  
Trade expansion has also been argued to be female labor intensive, although again 
the effects on well-being are ambiguous. Although not focused on specifically on gender, 
Winters, McCulloch, and McKay’s (2004) conclude from their review of the empirical 
evidence that trade liberalization can and often does reduce income poverty, due to 
falling prices and expanded employment opportunities. Given that women are considered 
to be over-represented among the poor, it might be expected that trade liberalization in 
the region over the last 30 years has contributed to greater gender equity in well-being.  
Several studies note, however, that the employment benefits of trade liberalization 
differentially affect women and men due to job segregation that slots women for less 
desirable jobs (Fontana, Joekes, and Masika 1998; Cagatay 2001). The positive effect of 
female access to paid work is offset by women’s relatively weaker bargaining power to 
negotiate with employers for higher wages. In research on Mexican maquila workers, 
Fussell (2002) finds, for example, that as export manufacturing has become more 
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competitive internationally, wages have declined steadily. She notes that although export 
manufacturing “may provide employment to the least-skilled women who have few other 
options in the local labor market…overall, it reflects a race to the bottom in 
manufacturing wages resulting from globalization of production” (Fussell 2000: 77). This 
is because women tend to be concentrated in “mobile” industries—industries for which it 
is relatively easier to relocate to lower wage sites, should wages rise, as compared to men 
who are more concentrated in non-tradable, capital-intensive industries (Brofenbrenner 
2000; Seguino 2000c, 2003).  
 Further, women’s access to paid work may increase total labor time, if men do 
not contribute to the performance of unpaid tasks (Floro 1995). Female unpaid labor time 
may also increase if liberalization results in male out migration in search of work, as in 
the case of Mexican corn farmers post-NAFTA (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004). 
Insofar as increased workload compromises women’s health (or leads to excessive 
demands on girl children), female relative well-being may be compromised. Moreover, 
while import tariff reductions can reduce the cost of basic goods, which benefits women 
in their role as family caretakers, they may be costly if this leads to disproportionate 
female loss of employment. Trade liberalization is also often associated with currency 
devaluation, which raises the cost of imported goods, and in those cases, household 
budgets are squeezed, placing greater pressure on women to find alternative resources to 
support their families.  
Finally, economic growth increases resources available for government 
investment in public goods that improve well-being. But two problems exist, making the 
link between growth, public spending, and equity tenuous. First, there has been a marked 
increase in pressure from international financial institutions and financial markets for 
governments to privatize social services and to reduce public sector spending. Second, 
there is no guarantee that public expenditures will be gender-enabling. Gender-sensitive 
budget analysis reveals government spending as a source of inequality in gender well-
being.5  
We can summarize this discussion by describing the potential effects of growth on 
women’s relative well-being as occurring along three pathways. As per capita income 
rises, more resources can be shared with women: 1) at the household level, because 
higher incomes leave more resources for female members of the family, who previously 
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received a smaller share; 2) due to higher levels of government spending, insofar as these 
increase female access to education and health care, 3) because job creation 
disproportionately benefits women, and as a result, women have more bargaining power 
in the household and/or are seen as more economically valuable.  
An alternative viewpoint is that women’s ability to achieve parity in quality of life 
with men is likely to depend on the type of growth process and development strategy, 
with equity dependent on strategies that favorably affect, for example, the distribution of 
jobs by sex, and state-level expenditure patterns that are female-enabling. Indeed, it can 
be argued that growth is not necessary for 2) and 3) to occur since, regardless of the 
growth rate of the economy, government could choose to reallocate expenditures to social 
spending that benefits women, or could increase women’s relative access to jobs, by such 
policies as affirmative action.6 In this view, economic growth, as pursued in the recent 
period of globalization, is not sufficient to improve relative well-being. 
 
III. CONCEPTUALIZING WELL-BEING 
This paper considers the question of whether growth in the recent period of 
globalization has promoted gender equity in well-being in LAC. I focus on relative 
indicators of female well-being rather than absolute, since improved female bargaining 
power (which relative improvements in female well-being implies) is an essential means 
to leverage change in otherwise discriminatory norms and institutions.   
Numerous efforts have been made in recent years to develop adequate indicators 
of gender differences in well-being. Recent research argues that gender relative well-
being can be conceptualized as operating along three dimensions: 1) capabilities gaps 
refers to basic human abilities as measured through education, health and nutrition; 2) 
differences in access to resources and opportunities refers primarily to equality in the 
opportunity to generate income, measured with wage and employment data; and 3) 
empowerment reflects women’s ability to participate in deliberative bodies in key social, 
economic and political institutions (Grown, Gupta, and Khan 2003; Malhotra, Schuler, 
and Boender 2002). The latter are often represented using female share of parliamentary 
seats and women’s share of professional and technical positions as well as their share of 
managerial and administrative jobs.  
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It should be noted that there are likely feedback effects between the three 
categories of well-being. For example, an improvement in capabilities can establish the 
preconditions for participation in income-generating activities. The recent bargaining 
power literature, however, emphasizes that women’s lesser well-being relative to men’s 
is often due to unequal power in the household. Improvements in women’s fallback 
position or outside options, as indicated by relative access to income, can improve their 
ability within the household to negotiate for an equitable distribution of resources and 
unpaid labor burden. The shift in power may have a positive effect on capabilities, 
particularly those of the young. It may also leverage women’s increased access to 
deliberative bodies and to positions of economic power.  
This study focuses on the capabilities and opportunities dimensions of well-being, 
although the specific indicators in each category differ somewhat from those used in 
other studies. (For a detailed discussion of all indicators, see Appendix A). In the 
capabilities category, three health indicators7 are used: the ratio of females to males in 
the population, the ratio of female to male mortality rates relative to a representative 
developed country (Sweden), and the fertility rate. In addition, there are three education 
variables: the ratio of female to male gross secondary school enrollment rates, the ratio of 
male to female illiteracy rates, and the ratio of female to male educational attainment for 
those over 15. Indicators of women’s relative access to material resources are: the female 
share of the labor force, female share of total employment, and the ratio of male to female 
unemployment rates. This amounts to a 2/3 weighting for capabilities variables and 1/3 
weighting of variables measuring access to resources and opportunities. Political and 
economic empowerment variables, though important, had to be omitted due to data 
deficiencies.  
 There have also been efforts to develop composite measures of gender equity in 
well-being. These are useful since there are divergences in gender equity across 
indicators even within the same country. Thus a country might have comparatively high 
relative female educational attainment, but score poorly on health indicators. The most 
well-known of these, the UNDP’s Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM), are problematic due to income components which 
confound absolute with relative well-being.8 Cross-country comparisons of trends in 
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well-being require that another method to aggregate the indicators be found. In this paper, 
I use a very simple method of rank order scoring, the Borda Rule.   
 
IV. RELATIVE FEMALE WELL-BEING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 
Data on the nine indicators discussed in the previous section were amassed for 21 
Latin American and Caribbean countries for the period 1970 to 2000, or the closest year, 
where noted (See Table B.1 in Appendix B for a list of countries in the sample, and Table 
B.2. for a list of variables, definitions, and sources). This section provides an analysis of 
those data, evaluating cross-country differences in well-being in 2000 as well as secular 
trends in gender equity in well-being for the period 1970 to 2000. Countries with more 
than 3 missing variables were dropped from the sample, and unfortunately, this included 
a number of the small Caribbean island economies, making that region disproportionately 
underrepresented in the sample.  
 
A. Data on well-being 
A summary of gendered differences in well-being indicators for 21 Latin America 
and Caribbean economies in 2000 is given in Table 1. The cross-country comparisons 
show substantial variation in well-being across indicators. Some variables are correlated, 
as shown in Table 2, although in a number of cases, correlations are weak, arguing for the 
relevance of a composite index rather than relying on a single indicator. Notable is the 
strong positive correlation between female share of the labor force and the ratio of 
females to males in the population. Although this does not provide any information on 
causality, it is consistent with the argument that female bargaining power evidenced by 
participation in labor markets can influence gender well-being in other categories.  
(Tables 1 and 2 about here). 
Data on total years of educational attainment were missing for two countries—
Bahamas and Belize. In order to retain as many countries as possible in the sample, 
missing data values were predicted by regressing the variable with missing values on the 
remaining well-being indicators.9 The resulting parameter estimates were used to predict 
the missing observations. (Those values that are predicted are shown in bold type in 
Table 1).    
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It is useful to discuss for a moment the issue of ratios of female to male 
educational attainment that exceed 1, which gives the impression of male disadvantage. 
This occurs in several countries in our sample, particularly in Anglophone Caribbean 
countries. A consequence of this state of affairs has been the proliferation of the thesis of 
the marginalization of the Caribbean male, with the ensuing debate reflecting confusion 
as to the legitimacy of continuing to focus on women, given male underachievement in 
education (Barriteau 2003).10 From this perspective, it could be argued that if our concern 
is gender equity, male disadvantage should also be penalized in our assessments of a 
country’s progress. Mathematically devising a formula to do so in these analyses does not 
pose a problem. Rather, of deeper concern are the conceptual issues. Should a country be 
considered male disadvantaged in some areas, e.g., education, if male well-being exceeds 
that of females in several others? Given the gender inequities in most other categories, for 
this analysis, I forgo use of a ranking strategy that penalizes male inequality.  
Focusing on how women’s relative well-being has changed over time, Table 3 
summarizes changes in gendered measures of well-being for the period 1970 to 2000. In 
many cases, the direction of change is toward improvement in well-being, but there are a 
number of cases in which female relative well-being has worsened.  
Several categories are of particular interest. The ratio of females to males in the 
population fell in 10 out of 21 countries. In other contexts, low F/M population ratios are 
attributed to female disadvantage in access to food, nutrition, or infanticide and sex 
selective abortion (Sen 1990). In the Caribbean, the cause may be more strongly related 
to female out-migration, which occurs at a slightly higher rate than for males. In seven 
countries, the ratio of female to male unemployment rates fell, indicating women’s 
decreasing ability to obtain work relative to men. Women’s relative access to secondary 
schooling also fell in 6 countries, while the ratio of female to male unemployment rates 
rose in 8 countries, indicating an increased burden of joblessness borne by women. Note 
also that in four countries, female to male educational attainment fell.  
Average changes (weighted and unweighted by population) are shown in the last 
two lines of the table. On average, the unweighted change is towards improved well-
being (the improvement is statistically significant for all but F/M population ratios and 
unemployment rates). With regard to weighted changes in well-being, the single 
dimension along which women fare worse is access to work, as indicated by the increase 
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in the female to male unemployment rate ratio. This is driven by declines in women’s 
relative access to work in Brazil, the largest country in the sample. The decline is 
statistically significant.  
These average data allow us to make some comparisons between flow and stock 
variables, the former representing current levels of female disadvantage and the latter 
cumulative disadvantage. We might anticipate that if female disadvantage were waning, 
the average change in secondary school enrollment rates (a flow) would be larger than 
change in total educational attainment (a stock). It is larger, a difference that is 
statistically significant.  
On the other hand, while the weighted average change in female share of the labor 
force was 11.64 percentage points for this sample, women’s share of employment 
increased only 5.73 percentage points. This is indicative of women’s greater difficulty in 
finding employment, and is also consistent with the view of numerous observers that 
female labor force participation in LAC in the past 2 decades is related to distress sales of 
labor as male incomes have declined and public services decreased, rather than an 
emancipatory reallocation of labor time.     
(Table 3 about here). 
B. Ranking Ordering Using the Borda Rule 
A cross-country comparison of trends in well-being requires that we find a 
method to aggregate the set of indicators. To do this, I use a very simple method of rank-
order scoring, the Borda Rule. The basis of the rule is as follows. To rank countries 
according to an aggregate measure, we give equal weight to each indicator. A country is 
awarded a point equal to its rank for each criterion (or indicator).  I then sum the points 
for each indicator to obtain an aggregate score and that score is used to rank countries.11 
Table 4 gives the ranking for the greatest change in gender equity in well-being from 
1970-2000.  
(Table 4 about here). 
No country does uniformly well in all categories. For example, in the case of 
Anglophone Caribbean, males are significantly less likely be unemployed than females, 
despite lower average levels of educational attainment.12 There also is little uniformity in 
rankings within categories (i.e., health, education, and labor market variables), although 
rankings are most similar across health categories. (Thus, a country that ranks low in 
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gender equity in one of those categories has a similarly low ranking in the remaining two 
health categories as well).   
El Salvador ranks highest in improvement in women’s relative well-being, a 
notable feat since per capita GDP growth over this 30-year period averaged -0.25% a 
year, while Colombia is second. The performance of El Salvador and Colombia is 
surprising, given the long period of conflict these countries have undergone. War is often 
associated with declines in male share of the population and labor force, suggesting that 
these improvements may be due to downward harmonization rather than improvement in 
female well-being. On the other hand, war and conflict have been shown to have severely 
negative consequences for women in terms of violence, resulting in part from norms of 
hyper-masculinity that surge during such times (UNIFEM 2002). There are, however, 
indications that the driving force in the improved rankings of El Salvador and Colombia 
is improvements in female well-being. For example, in both countries, fertility declined 
by half and substantial improvements in female education absolutely as well as relatively 
were registered. Mexico ranks third, and this performance fits with the predictions of 
globalization proponents that liberalization is good for women. 
The two countries with the highest per capita growth over this period—Chile and 
Dominican Republic—ranked among the lowest. Trinidad and Tobago, with a petroleum-
based economy and therefore substantial government revenues for public investment, 
nevertheless ranks very low also. Some countries might rank low for change in gender 
gaps if they started at a very high level of gender equity, and thus had little distance to go 
to close gender gaps. Such is the case of Barbados, which ranks second for gender equity 
in well-being in 2000, and last in change in gender equity in well-being from 1970 to 
2000.   
I consider more formally the relationship between growth and well-being in the 
next section of the paper. Here, for illustrative purposes, I estimate the effect of growth 
on well-being, using a methodology similar to one used by the World Bank (2001), albeit 
with a more restricted sample. The Bank analysis is based on regressions of single 
indicators of well-being in 1995 (rather than a composite index) on the natural log of per 
capita GDP in 1995.13 They find that per capita GDP has a positive effect on gender 
equity in well-being. The Bank argues, on the basis of these results, that promotion of 
economic growth is a critical component of any program to reduce gender inequality. By 
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using per capita GDP in the end year of the analysis, the Bank’s method fails to isolate 
the effects of the macroeconomic policies associated with globalization on well-being 
over the last 25 years. Those are precisely the policies of which many gender experts 
have been so critical for their negative effects on women’s well-being.  
In order to evaluate the impact of globalization policies, it would be necessary to 
isolate the effect of changes in per capita income during the relevant period. I do this by 
regressing Borda rankings for change in equity on total growth of per capita GDP for the 
period 1970-2000, controlling for initial per capita income (in 1970).14 Initial income has 
a positive effect on equity in well-being, implying that those countries with the largest 
gains in gender equity already had the highest per capita income by 1970. But, as the 
scatter plot in Figure 1 shows there is a negative association between GDP growth from 
1970-2000 and equity. (That figure shows the partial correlation of equity with total per 
capita income growth from 1970 to 2000, with the trend line given by a LOESS fit). The 
coefficient on the growth variable is significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that 
improvements in women's well-being during this period, where they did occur, were due 
to factors other than globalization-induced growth. These results may not be surprising 
since 5 out of the 10 highest ranked countries in Table 4 peaked in terms of per capita 
GDP during the 1970s or earlier. 
(Figure 1 about here). 
In reality and in contrast to the Bank’s claims, economic growth in the current 
environment of liberalization can produce contradictory gender effects. Structural change 
induced by growth may generate employment, thus increasing women’s access to private 
sources of income. But state-distributed resources may decline with pressure on public 
sector budgets. Women’s increased employment, even if due to distress sales of labor and 
despite the insecurity of work, may improve their status within the household. This might 
occur if they are perceived to have a more important role in providing household income, 
whether because their access to work has increased or because men’s has declined. But 
the shift in bargaining power within the household may also stimulate a backlash against 
females that shows up in other ways, such as family dissolution or violence against 
women. While micro level analyses are needed to assess the household level effects of 
such policies, in the next section, I attempt to disentangle these various macro-level 
factors that influence well-being.   
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V. PANEL DATA RESULTS 
In this section, I assess the determinants of gender equity in well-being across 
countries over time. I use individual indicators as dependent variables for the panel data 
analysis for several reasons. While a composite index is useful for ranking countries 
according to well-being, the variance of the dependent variable is artificially constrained 
by the range of ranks. Second, independent variables may operate on individual measures 
of well-being differently (see, for example, Richards, Delleny, and Sweeney 2002; 
Mason and Smith 2003). Finally, missing data makes computation of a time-series 
composite index unreliable. 
A. Variables 
The dependent variables used in the regressions are: female to male population 
ratio, ratio of female to male secondary school enrollment, and relative female to male 
mortality rates. The choice of these individual measures can be explained as follows. If 
we were to choose a single measure of gendered differences in quality of life, a good 
proxy is the female to male population ratio. Decisions to invest in female children’s 
nutrition, health care, and even seeing a pregnancy through when the fetus is known to be 
female, reflects society’s valuation of females. Social perceptions aside, improvements in 
women’s access to power and material resources enable them to invest more in their 
daughters’ health and nutrition, and to avoid sex-selective abortions or infanticide that 
favors males. In LAC, a decline in F/M population ratios can also be due to female-
intensive out-migration, rather than a reduction in life chances. The lack of employment 
opportunities to sustain self and families that this implies, however, is in itself an 
important indicator of female relative well-being. More generally, then the F/M 
population ratio can be seen as a proxy measure of gender well-being, but does not reveal 
the precise processes that contribute to changes in gender gaps.   
I explore growth effects on gross secondary school enrollment rates, a measure 
that can be considered a flow variable, as noted—it reflects current gender norms and 
stereotypes as well as bargaining power, in contrast to measures of total educational 
attainment, which summarizes current and past discrimination. Finally, I test for 
determinants of relative female to male mortality rates (relative, that is, to the ratio in the 
reference country, Sweden. See Appendix A for more details on this variable). This 
variable may capture differences in women and men’s access to income and other 
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resources that can sustain health. The gap could also vary across countries and over time, 
in response to changes in the adequacy of a country’s health care system and 
infrastructure that insure, for example, clean water and protection from infectious 
diseases. It may thus also be influenced by a country’s stage of development, in addition 
to gender gaps in income and empowerment. 
From the previous discussion, right-hand side variables fall into four categories: 
1) economic growth, 2) economic structure, 3) government spending, and 4) women’s 
empowerment. I turn first to a discussion of the independent variables. (All regression 
variables and codes are listed in Table 5).15  
1) Economic Growth 
 Economic growth is measured as average annual GDP growth from 1970 to 
2000. There may be reason to be concerned that economic growth is not truly exogenous, 
if equity influences growth. I therefore also run regressions with investment growth and 
export growth, two variables causally linked to growth in the literature.  
2) Economic Structure 
I test for the effects of economic structure by including as regressor 
manufacturing value-added as a percentage of GDP. The expansion of manufacturing as a 
share of GDP, particularly light-manufacturing, is linked to improvement in women’s job 
access. Countries specializing in manufactured exports for which terms of trade are 
declining, however, may find that specialization in this area yields few if any benefits for 
well-being. This is an especially salient issue for developing countries, since there is 
evidence that light-manufacturing expansion among semi-industrialized economies has 
also led to a process of immiserizing growth (Erturk 2001-02). Whether this differentially 
impacts women depends on how the effects of declining terms of trade are distributed. If 
it leads to greater stresses on females as a result of deterioration of work conditions due 
to competitive pressures, then gender effects may be apparent. Services value-added as a 
share of GDP is also used to capture structural change. Finally, trade as a share of GDP is 
used as an additional economic structure variable. Gender effects are ambiguous. Women 
are the target labor supply for labor-intensive industries, but mobility of firms holds down 
compensation.  
3) Government Expenditures 
 15
Government spending can act as a redistributive mechanism such that women’s 
relative well-being is enhanced by increases in social expenditures. Whether such 
spending is gender-equitable is an empirical question, since governments may allocate 
spending in such a way that reinforces rather than rectifies gender imbalances in well-
being. To capture this effect, I use the growth rate of government consumption, adjusted 
for inflation. The government consumption variable is imprecise since it includes a 
variety of other expenditures unrelated to well-being. Data on measures such as public 
health and education spending are incomplete, however, and thus I am forced to rely on 
government spending in the aggregate. In addition, I include measures of debt as a 
percentage of exports which may affect expenditures on public goods that can affect 
women’s relative well-being and may thus also attenuate the benefits of export earnings 
for the domestic economy.  
4) Empowerment 
Finally, as an empowerment variable, I use female share of the labor force. This 
variable represents a means to well-being as well as an end (insofar as access to work 
may improve the quality of life intrinsically), since it reflects female access to income 
that can increase household bargaining power. As noted, even unpaid work may improve 
women’s value to the household and thus status, allowing them to leverage more 
resources for female family members. Female share of employment would have been 
preferred as a variable here, but it could not be used due to a large number of missing 
values.    
These categories of right-hand side variables listed above represent the diverse 
avenues through which female well-being may improve. The growth variable reflects the 
effect of total expansion of resources, while economic structure, government resources, 
and female empowerment may have redistributive effects. Of the three redistributive 
effects, the first occurs as a result of the interaction of economic structural change with 
labor markets, mediated by gendered job access. The second reflects government policy. 
(While government policy is itself likely to be influenced by female political 
representation, political empowerment measures are not available for time-series 
analysis). Finally, the third represents the effect of greater female bargaining power that 
results from the effect of labor market access on distribution within the household.  
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 (Table 5 about here). 
 
B. Data and Estimation 
Regressions are estimated using a two-way error components model. The basic 
model can be summarized as: 
Yit =  α  + Xit β + υ it  
where the error term υit has three components: 
υit = μi + λt + ε it.  
Here μ i captures the country specific-effects while λ t represents time-varying effects. 
Country (fixed) effects control for unobserved time-invariant differences that might affect 
the gender well-being variable. 
Various econometric issues need to be considered. First, one may expect 
measurement errors due to inaccuracies in schooling, labor force participation, as well as 
in some macroeconomic variables, leading to large standard errors, and thus a downward 
bias on t-statistics. This may not necessarily lead to misleading econometric results, 
provided that the biases are constant over time and the errors are random. In addition, the 
use of pooled time-series data, which yields a large number of observations, permits 
behavioral relationships to be detected, even though non-trivial random errors in the data 
may exist. 
Second, data must be stationary in order for standard inference procedures to 
apply in time-series analysis. To check for stationarity, unit root tests were conducted. 
Those variables that were found to be non-stationary were first-differenced, resulting in 
stationary series. Variables so-adjusted are preceded by a difference operator in the 
reported regression results. 
Heteroskedasticity problems are frequently encountered with cross-sectional data, 
and therefore regressions use GLS, with cross-sectional weights derived from the residual 
cross-sectional standard deviations. While this procedure corrects for heteroskedasticity 
across countries, a more general form is necessary to allow variances within a cross 
section to vary over time. This was done by obtaining standard errors in accordance with 
White's variance-covariance matrix in all regressions. I also corrected for autocorrelation, 
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where necessary, using an autoregressive process modeled as an AR(1) with a common 
country coefficient.  
Some right-hand side variables are potentially endogenous. In particular, the 
growth rate of GDP may be simultaneously determined by the gender variables.16 This is 
less likely to be an issue with the schooling measure used here, but it may be relevant for 
the population ratio and mortality ratio. To check for this, Hausmann tests were run with 
the results indicating no evidence of endogeneity for per capita GDP growth.17 In 
addition, I ran a set of regressions, proxying for GDP growth with the growth rate of 
gross fixed capital formation and export growth. The literature suggests these variables 
are correlated with GDP growth, but not with the dependent variables (There is, however, 
some dispute about the effect of exports on growth. See, for example, Rodriquez and 
Rodrik 2001).  
Finally, these regressions use unbalanced panels, due to the variations in data 
availability. Thus, the inclusion or exclusion of certain variables causes the sample size to 
change. This does not present any econometric problems, and may be viewed as a test of 
robustness of the independent variables. In this analysis, however, some variables have 
missing data for all countries for the 1970s and 1980s, for example, and thus inclusion of 
those variables causes the period of analysis to change. In those cases, the results are not 
strictly comparable to regressions where variables span the entire period—1970-2000. 
C. Results 
Regression results from estimating the determinants of the female to male 
population ratio (FMPOP) are given in Table 6. The lagged value of  d(FMPOP ) is used 
to capture prior differences in across countries, with the coefficient measuring 
adjustments to the FMPOP, assuming no differences in the remaining independent 
variables, and d(·) is the difference operator. Equation 1 shows that economic growth 
(GR) has a significant negative effect on FMPOP. Structural change variables—
manufacturing and service value-added as share of GDP (MFGVA and SERVVA)—are 
significant, and suggest a positive effect on gender equity. Trade as a share of GDP 
(TRADE) and debt as a percentage of exports (DEBTX ) are insignificant, however. The 
female share of the labor force (FSHLF) is positive but insignificant, and this may 
suggest that female-intensive employment effects of structural change are captured by 
MFGVA and SERVVA. The coefficient on growth rate of government consumption 
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(GRGOV) is positive and significant. (We should not read much into the high R2 since the 
lagged dependent variable is likely the cause).  
Equation 2 proxies for economic growth with the growth rate of gross fixed 
capital formation (INVGR) and the growth rate of exports of goods and services (XGR). 
Neither of these variables is significant, and they have opposite signs. MFGVA continues 
to be positive and significant, along with the growth rate of government consumption, 
while the positive coefficient on female share of the labor force becomes significant in 
this regression 
 
(Table 6 about here). 
Table 7 presents the results of regressing the change in the ratio of female to male 
gross secondary school enrollment rates on the same set of independent variables. Here, 
in equation 1, the coefficient on economic growth is insignificant, while MFGVA is 
positive and significant. Trade as a share of GDP is negative and significant, while the 
remaining variables are insignificant. The adjusted R2 of these regressions falls 
dramatically. These results suggest multiple contradictory processes at work. 
Interestingly, the growth of government expenditures has no effect on gender equity in 
education, suggesting that public spending on education has not contributed to a closure 
of gender gaps. But the shift to manufacturing has had a positive effect, and may well be 
related to incentives to invest in female education as a result of women’s expanded work 
opportunities. (It could also signify that when women gain access to employment, they 
are able to leverage more gender equitable education spending). On the other hand, trade 
has a negative effect on education. The pathway by which trade negatively affects female 
education is not revealed in this analysis, and requires country-level case studies to 
answer that question. As the gender and trade literature suggests however, it could be 
related to the effect of higher cost imports (from devaluation) that  reduces household 
income available for education expenditures, with girls more disadvantaged than boys.  
Equation 2 shows that investment growth has a positive effect on female relative 
education, while export growth exerts a negative significant effect. It is not clear why 
these variables would operate in opposite directions, unless in fact declining terms of 
trade or instability of export earnings produce negative gender effects. Nevertheless, the 
sum of these coefficients is roughly zero, suggesting that the net effect on education is 
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small (a Wald test confirms that the sum of these coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero). The structural change variables retain their significance in this equation, 
again with the exception that SERVVA becomes positive and significant. 
Table 8 presents results on the determinants of relative female to male mortality. 
A positive sign on coefficients indicates that increases in the independent variables 
contribute to higher female mortality relative to males—thus a deterioration of gender 
equity in well-being. The first equation shows a positive significant effect of growth on 
women’s relative mortality (relative to men’s and relative to the reference country ratio). 
Increases in the debt ratio raise female relative mortality rates, while female share of the 
labor force and the growth rate of government expenditures have significant negative 
effects. These results should be viewed with some caution since, as the Breusch-Godfrey 
test shows, autocorrelation is present, and could not be eliminated with standard 
techniques. Equation 2 results show that the growth variables have an insignificant effect, 
while SERVVA and DEBTX exhibit positive effects which are significant. At the same 
time, FSHLF and GRGOV retain their negative significant effect.  
The contradictory effect of SERVVA as compared to FSHLF is difficult to explain, 
but may be due to collinearity of these variables if indeed structural shift partially induces 
female entrance into paid labor force. (Re-estimation of these equations with MFGVA 
SERVVA, dropping FSHLF, results in positive but insignificant coefficients on these 
variables).  
(Table 8 about here). 
 
VI. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Table 9 summarizes results from the panel data estimations. Four variables have 
positive effects on gender equity in well-being (with varying degrees of robustness): 
manufacturing and service value-added as a share of GDP, female share of the labor 
force, and the growth rate of government consumption. The positive effect of the shift to 
manufacturing is noteworthy, and this may occur via the impact on the relative demand 
for female labor. Despite the fact that female share of the labor force includes both 
employed and unemployed women, as well as paid and unpaid work, it is clear from 
these results that women’s economic activity improves their well-being. Whether due to 
the bargaining power that this confers on women to negotiate with male members of the 
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family, or because women directly generate income, the effect is positive and significant 
in most cases here.  
(Table 9 about here). 
The remaining variables do not have a consistently positive or negative effect on 
gender equity in well-being, with the exception of economic growth to which I now turn.  
These results show a negative effect of economic growth on F/M population ratios and a 
positive effect on F/M mortality (and no effect on gender gaps in education). These 
results are consistent with those for several Asian economies, where growth was also 
found to have a negative (but statistically insignificant) effect on female relative 
population ratios (Seguino 2002). The evidence for Asia is consistent with research 
showing that inequality is lower among poorer income households in that region (Murthi, 
Guio, and Drèze 1995), while higher FMPOP ratios go hand-in-hand with higher levels 
of poverty (Drèze and Sen 1995). One reason advanced to explain why female relative 
well-being may decline as incomes rise is the ‘emulation’ effect, explained as follows. In 
low-income households, women’s labor is crucial for family survival, especially in 
agricultural households. But as incomes rise, poor classes seek to emulate wealthier ones 
that limit women’s economic activity (despite women’s high levels of education). The 
practice of circumscribing women’s activities enhances the patriarch’s social status since 
it acts as an indicator of the male head of household’s wealth. The result for women, 
however, is that their bargaining power decreases.  
Latin America and the Caribbean, however, are influenced not only by differing 
economic structures, but also by very diverse sets of gender norms and stereotypes. In 
Anglophone Caribbean, women have more freedom to participate in labor markets, 
although this is less the case in Central America (see, for example, Fleck 1996). 
Nevertheless, seclusion is not practiced in the Americas and thus higher income is less 
likely to induce this “emulation effect.” If not, a different explanation has to be sought for 
why growth does not improve gender equity in well-being.  
The answer may be found in the type of growth, or the characteristics of the 
growth process. If growth results in increased economic insecurity and job “flexibility,” 
due to the process of globalization that makes capital more mobile, women may 
differentially bear the costs of economic insecurity, which may be driving the results 
found here for population ratios. In the Caribbean, for example, one result of economic 
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insecurity has been out-migration, with women more likely to emigrate than men. 
Further, if women are more likely to get the insecure jobs or bear the burden of  
government expenditures that reduce social services, then improvements in female 
relative well-being are likely to be stymied, even with growth.  
The inability for growth to improve women’s relative well-being may also be due 
to a “backlash” against women of downward harmonization as a result of a deterioration 
of men’s economic status. Much of the research on this region in recent years indicates 
that women have entered the labor force at least in part in response to declining incomes 
and employment of male household members. The erosion of men’s well-being and 
income generating opportunities may contribute to higher rates of domestic violence, as 
men’s traditional role as breadwinner is comprised, leading to a “crisis of masculinity” 
(Chant 2000). Thus, men’s inability to fulfill norms of masculinity may have produced 
negative reactions to women that have redounded negatively on F/M population ratios 
and relative mortality rates.  
There is some evidence consistent with this explanation. For example, Soledad 
Larraín (1998) notes that Latin America and the Caribbean, the part of the world with the 
least equitable distribution of wealth, is also one of the areas with the highest rates of 
violence in the home.18 Larraín argues that unequal income distribution is one of the 
chief factors fuelling the rise in domestic violence in Latin America and the Caribbean.19 
Gatti (1998) reports on research conducted by the IDB which shows that women who 
work outside of their homes and earn their own incomes are less likely to be beaten, and 
have greater possibilities of escaping the situation by separating from their partners.20
course, one of the problems observed is that the jobs that many women can get in export 
industries or informal sector jobs make it difficult to bargain for higher wages, and thus, 
their employment may both put them in danger of backlash at home, and leave them 
unable to escape due to low wages.
 Of 
21 
Negative effects of men’s declining economic fortunes may also put pressure on 
family structures in a way that increases women’s labor burdens. Based on research in 
rural Costa Rica, Chant (2000) finds that men’s declining economic opportunities lead to 
family dissolution, as echoed by Martín, a 30 year old bricklayer, who participated in a 
focus group session: “La mujer que tiene su propia plata pierde el cariño para el esposo.  
Muchos matrimonios han fracasado por eso”  (“A woman who has her own money loses 
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affection for her husband. Many marriages have been ruined because of this”). According 
to Chant, men’s inability to provide can set in motion a vicious circle whereby men 
abandon their responsibilities and women increase labor effort to fill the gap. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I develop a set of indicators to track trends in gender equity in well-
being over the period 1970 to 2000 for Latin America and the Caribbean. Using a 
composite index based on these indicators, I rank countries according to equity in well-
being in 2000 and change in gender equity over the past 30 years. The data show that 
gender equity in well-being has improved but not unambiguously so. Several countries 
have experienced declines in individual indicators of well-being, and there is a significant 
worsening of women’s experience of unemployment relative to men’s. Growth since 
1970 is not shown to improve gender equity, measured using a composite index. 
In panel data estimations, economic growth exhibits a negative effect on female to 
male population ratios and a positive effect on relative female to male mortality rates, 
while manufacturing and service value-added as a share of GDP are positively correlated 
with improvements in women’s relative well-being as are government consumption 
growth and to a lesser extent, female share of the labor force are notable.  
Economic growth under liberalized conditions appears to have contradictory, and 
in some cases, worryingly negative gender effects. Unraveling those contradictions is a 
complex task, and country–specific conditions probably play an important role, making it 
impossible to generalize about the precise dynamics at play. That said, it appears that 
macroeconomic, trade, and finance policies in the last 30 years have contributed to the 
growth of insecure employment. Men have also been negatively affected, and women 
have responded by trying to cushion adverse effects on household income by increasing 
paid labor time. Many who have gained access to employment have done so primarily in 
insecure positions and frequently in the informal economy. The social insurance 
necessary to cushion that increased vulnerability in markets is not forthcoming, due to 
limits on the ability of the state to provide a social safety net.  
While this paper attempts to provide a panoramic view of progress in achieving 
equity in well-being, there are limitations to this exercise that must be acknowledged. 
Gender-disaggregated data are still in short supply, and many of our measures are only 
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proxies. Second, the most serious weakness of this paper, in my view, is the lack of detail 
on the effect of ethnicity on gender equity. In fact, it is possible, that gender inequity 
varies by ethnicity, with subaltern women bearing the greatest burden of inequality. I am, 
however, constrained by lack of country-level data to assess this, and it thus remains the 
object of future work.  
This brings me to my last point, which is that a study such as this allows us to see 
broad trends and consider the role of macroeconomic policy, but a deeper understanding 
of causality and connections is usefully gained at the country level. A case-study 
approach could give us some insight into why growth, for example, appears to have no 
discernible effect on secondary schooling equity, but has a negative effect on female to 
male population ratios. Such studies would also be able to illuminate more fully the types 
of government expenditures that are gender-enabling and the processes that have led to 
such redistributive policies. Finally, the connective tissue in these relationships is 
political, economic, and social institutions which vary across countries, and to fully 
understand trends, we also need to know how they are supporting or impeding change.      
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NOTES 
 
1 Gender well-being is measured as gross secondary school enrollment ratios in both studies and society’s 
resources are measured as per capita income. Additional control variables are incorporated into the 
analyses, including measures of civil freedoms and culture (e.g., religious preference).  
 
2 See, for example, Amsden (1998) and Chang (2002) on the role of the state, and Seguino and Grown 
(2003) on these issues as regards gender equality. 
 
3 On the gender effects, see, for example Benería (2001), Sayeed and Balakrishnan (2002), and 
Balakrishnan (2002). On wage-led and profit-led growth, see Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), and for the 
relationship between income distribution, gender and growth, see Blecker and Seguino (2002). 
   
4An example of this is the expansion of data processing in Jamaica and Barbados, as well as the growth of 
call centers in India. 
 
5 In LAC, Barbados has been in the forefront of these initiatives, and St. Kitts and Nevis and Trinidad and 
Tobago have also begun or are beginning to develop the methodologies to conduct such audits.  
 
6 It could be argued, in response, that growth can enlarge the economic pie, making redistributive policies 
less gender-conflictive. The importance of that would depend on country-specific institutional 
arrangements that mediate conflict. In some cases, where such arrangements do not exist, male backlash in 
response to redistributive policies that favor women can be socially disruptive. 
 
7 Measures of HIV/AIDs incidence and maternal mortality are also useful indicators. They are not part of 
the analysis presented here, since accuracy of data on AIDs is questionable. I nevertheless did include these 
variables in well-being ranking for 2000 (results not reported here), and the rankings remained consistent to 
those without the additional indicators.  
 
8 For critiques of the GDI and GEM, see Bardhan and Klasen (1999), Oudhof (2001), Dijkstra (2002), and 
Elson (2002).  
 
9 Alternatively, one could simply substitute missing values with the mean for the non-missing observations. 
That method, however, has several limitations, including underestimation of the variance, and distortion of 
the shape of the distribution. In this case, the missing data estimation is more efficient because there are 
very few missing variables and a greater amount of available information is used. 
 
10 In the case of the Caribbean, men’s lower educational achievement appears to be related to higher male 
drop-out rates, as men leave school to engage lucrative income-earning (sometimes illegal) activities that 
do not require higher education. I cannot explain the relative higher female educational attainment in 
several of the Spanish-speaking countries in the sample. 
 
11 Thus, in our case, with 9 indicators and 21 countries, country A is awarded points between 1 (lowest 
achievement) and 21 (highest achievement) for each of 9 criteria. These are summed to provide the 
aggregate score (maximum = 189, minimum = 9), which is then used to rank countries on gender equality 
in well-being.   
 
12 Note also that the Borda ranks on youth illiteracy are also low for these countries. Given very low 
illiteracy rates in these countries (1-4 percent), the male to female ratios of illiteracy rates may not provide 
a great deal of information on gender equity.  
 
13 The World Bank study uses several measures of well-being that differ from those used here—e.g., life 
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expectancy and primary school enrollment.  
 
14 The Bank’s analysis also controls for gender equality in rights, using the Humana Index. That index is, 
however, outdated and is also very obscure in how gender equality is being measured, and so I do not 
include it here. 
  
15 See Table B.2 for sources of gender well-being data. All macroeconomic data listed in Table 5 are from 
World Development Indicators. 
 
16 Several studies make this link including Hill and King (1995), Dollar and Gatti (1999), and Seguino 
(2000a and 2000b), although using varying gender equity measures.   
 
17 This was done by regressing the gender variable on all independent variables (the “constrained” model). 
The “suspect” variable (GDP growth) was then regressed on all exogenous variables. The resulting fitted 
values were then added to the constrained model. T-tests of the significance of that variable did not support 
the hypothesis of endogeneity of the growth variable.  
18 There is also evidence of a dramatic increase in other forms of violence in the region since the 1970s, 
including homicides (Buvinic, Morrison, and Shifter 1999). 
 
19 Violence against women may not be exclusively domestic. For example, the spate of unsolved murders 
of approximately 370 women—many of whom were workers in the maquila industry—in Ciudad Juarez, 
Mexico over the past decade points to the insecurity of women’s lives  (Amnesty International 2004).  
These deaths may reflect a broader male hostility towards women (also evident in the failure of the police 
to take meaningful steps to solve the murders), possibly attributable to women’s increased visibility in the 
work arena that is perceived to be in competition with men’s job opportunities. 
 
20 The IDB research also notes that the incidence of domestic violence is high: one out of every four Latin 
American and Caribbean women have been the victims of physical abuse at home, while 60 to 85 percent 
had been subjected to some degree of psychological violence (Gatti 1998). 
 
21 There is evidence of this behavior from other parts of the world as well. For example, Pepall (1998) 
found that, among female borrowers in Bangladesh, a majority reported an increase in verbal and physical 
aggression from male relatives after taking out loans. 
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Table 1. Gender Well-Being Indicators for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000 
 
Country 
F/M Pop-
ulation 
F/M 
Mortality 
(rel. to 
Sweden) Fertility 
F/M 
Secondary 
School 
Enrollment 
rates 
F/M Youth 
Illiteracy 
Rate 
F/M Total 
Avg. Yrs. 
Education
Female 
Share of 
Labor 
Force 
Female 
Share of 
Total 
Employ-
ment 
Ratio F/M 
Unemploy-
ment 
Rates 
Argentina 1.04 0.81 2.51 1.08 0.71 1.02 32.7 40.0 1.16 
Bahamas 1.03 0.70 2.19 1.00 0.45 1.10 47.2 48.4 1.61 
Barbados  1.07 0.93 1.75 1.05 0.87 0.98 46.2 46.5 1.71 
Belize 0.98 1.03 3.13 1.15 0.48 0.90 23.9 31.0 1.87 
Bolivia  1.01 1.35 3.93 0.87 3.15 0.85 37.7 44.0 1.37 
Brazil 1.02 0.88 2.20 1.17 0.61 0.82 35.4 40.3 1.61 
Chile 1.02 0.88 2.16 1.02 0.64 0.99 33.2 33.3 1.26 
Colombia  1.02 0.91 2.55 1.11 0.65 1.17 38.4 44.7 1.35 
Costa Rica 1.00 0.98 2.50 1.12 0.70 0.99 30.8 32.3 1.67 
Dominican Republic 0.97 1.03 2.71 1.19 0.84 1.03 30.4 28.7 3.01 
Ecuador 0.99 1.08 3.03 1.04 1.20 1.00 27.7 38.7 1.81 
El Salvador  1.04 0.94 3.10 0.99 1.15 0.98 36.0 40.7 0.54 
Honduras 0.99 1.01 3.92 1.23 0.87 0.71 31.4 36.0 1.03 
Jamaica  1.02 1.09 2.46 1.04 0.27 1.15 46.2 42.0 2.23 
Mexico 1.05 0.99 2.59 1.03 1.35 0.91 32.9 33.3 1.47 
Panama 0.98 0.99 2.50 1.07 1.29 0.99 35.0 33.6 1.90 
Paraguay 0.98 1.05 2.50 1.05 1.03 0.97 29.8 42.5 1.10 
Peru 1.02 1.11 2.78 0.94 2.61 0.88 31.0 44.8 1.15 
Trinidad & Tobago 1.00 1.19 1.75 1.08 1.22 1.06 34.0 36.6 1.54 
Uruguay 1.06 0.72 2.23 1.33 0.56 1.09 41.5 42.4 1.68 
Venezuela  0.99 0.92 2.82 1.41 0.48 1.04 34.5 35.4 1.35 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix, Gender Well-Being Measurers for LAC, 2000 
 
  
F/M 
Population
Relative 
F/M 
Mortality Fertility 
F/M 
Secondary 
School 
Enrollment 
Rates 
F/M 
Youth 
Illiteracy 
Rate 
F/M Total 
Avg. Yrs. 
Education
Female 
Share of 
Labor 
Force 
Female 
Share of 
Total 
Employ-
ment 
Ratio F/M 
Unemployment 
Rates 
F/M Population 1.00 -0.44 -0.41 -0.19 -0.04 0.19 0.64 0.57 -0.30 
Relative F/M 
Mortality   1.00 0.44 -0.42 0.69 -0.31 -0.32 -0.14 0.08 
Fertility   1.00 -0.07 0.44 -0.56 -0.39 -0.14 -0.22 
F/M Secondary 
School Enrollment 
Rates    1.00 -0.60 -0.09 -0.11 -0.36 0.20 
F/M Youth Illiteracy 
Rate     1.00 -0.43 -0.16 0.21 0.24 
F/M Total Avg. Yrs. 
Education      1.00 0.45 0.20 0.30 
Female Share of 
Labor Force       1.00 0.66 0.06 
Female Share of 
Total Employment        1.00 -0.36 
Ratio F/M 
Unemployment Rates         1.00 
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Table 3. Change in Gender Well-Being in LAC, 1970-2000 
  
F/M Pop-
ulation 
Relative 
F/M 
Mortality Fertility 
F/M Secondary 
School Enroll-
ment rates 
F/M Youth 
Illiteracy 
Rate 
F/M Total 
Avg. Yrs. 
Education
Female 
Share of 
Labor 
Force 
Female 
Share of 
Total 
Employ-
ment 
Ratio F/M 
Unemploy-
ment Rate
Argentina 0.05 -0.10 0.60 -0.06 -0.20 0.06 7.84 6.25 -0.30 
Bahamas 0.01 -0.30 1.26 -0.10 -0.26 0.10 7.16 6.24 -0.90 
Barbados  -0.06 -0.12 1.27 0.03 0.11 -0.04 6.02 2.28 0.06 
Belize -0.03 -0.08 3.76 -0.08 -0.72 -0.08 3.16 -0.24 0.29 
Bolivia  -0.02 0.13 2.59 0.15 0.43 0.18 5.90 1.58 0.35 
Brazil 0.02 -0.38 2.79 0.14 -0.49 -0.08 11.74 9.04 0.66 
Chile -0.01 -0.11 1.79 -0.13 -0.41 0.03 10.84 3.87 -0.17 
Colombia  0.01 -0.42 2.92 0.14 -0.38 0.28 14.24 6.41 -0.06 
Costa Rica 0.01 -0.24 2.44 0.05 -0.27 0.00 12.70 8.00 -0.45 
Dominican Rep. 0.00 -0.28 3.34 -0.11 -0.20 0.08 8.24 0.10 0.36 
Ecuador 0.00 -0.27 3.17 0.19 -0.30 0.09 9.18 1.23 -0.19 
El Salvador  0.05 -0.31 3.21 0.08 -0.20 0.32 15.42 7.51 -1.42 
Honduras 0.00 -0.31 3.28 0.33 -0.19 -0.20 9.10 -6.28 -0.14 
Jamaica  -0.03 -0.11 2.85 0.05 -0.30 0.04 3.20 2.78 -0.53 
Mexico 0.05 -0.29 4.05 0.39 -0.21 0.27 13.80 2.32 -0.33 
Panama 0.02 -0.40 2.70 -0.05 0.13 0.00 9.82 4.77 0.48 
Paraguay -0.04 -0.20 3.41 0.02 -0.37 0.10 3.40 2.13 -0.51 
Peru 0.03 -0.25 3.44 0.17 -0.34 0.16 8.66 3.89 -0.09 
Trinidad & Tobago -0.02 -0.12 1.84 0.01 -0.61 0.11 4.50 6.29 -0.26 
Uruguay 0.05 -0.18 0.69 0.15 -0.05 0.04 15.24 3.45 0.04 
Venezuela  0.01 -0.22 2.50 0.35 -0.65 0.04 13.96 7.48 0.49 
Average Change 
Unweighted 0.005 -0.22 2.57 0.08 -0.26 0.07 9.24 3.77 -0.12 
Weighted 0.024 -0.30 2.89 0.18 -0.35 0.08 11.64 5.73 0.13 
Note: Fertility is measured as declines. Thus, for Argentina, female fertility fell 0.60. Average change refers to sample average changes in well-being. 
Bold italicized print in the last two rows indicates categories for which average change is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 4. Ranking for Change in Gender Equity in Well-Being, LAC 1970-2000 
Borda Ranking 
(1=Greatest 
Positive Change 
in Gender Well-
being) Country 
F/M Pop-
ulation 
Relative F/M 
Mortality Fertility 
F/M 
Secondary 
School 
Enroll-
ment rates
F/M Youth 
Illiteracy 
Rate 
F/M Total 
Avg. Yrs. 
Education 
Female 
Share of 
Labor 
Force 
Female 
Share of 
Total 
Employ-
ment 
Ratio F/M 
Unemploy
ment 
Rates 
Total 
Borda 
Points 
1 El Salvador 20 16 15 12 6 21 21 19 21 151 
2 Colombia 11 20 13 14 15 20 19 17 9 138 
3 Mexico 19 15 21 15 5 19 17 8 17 136 
4 Venezuela 12 13 8 20 19 10 18 18 2 120 
5 Peru 17 9 19 17 4 17 10 12 11 116 
6 Brazil 15 19 11 13 18 2 15 21 1 115 
7 Costa Rica 14 11 7 10 14 5 16 20 16 113 
8 Uruguay 21 17 2 16 8 8 20 10 8 110 
9 Bahamas 13 13 3 3 17 14 7 14 19 103 
10 Ecuador 10 10 14 18 7 13 12 4 10 98 
11 Argentina 18 7 1 5 13 11 8 15 18 96 
12 Honduras 8 14 16 19 9 1 11 1 15 94 
13 Paraguay 2 8 18 8 11 15 3 6 20 91 
14 Panama 16 18 10 6 2 6 13 13 4 88 
15 Jamaica 3 4 12 11 21 9 2 9 12 83 
16 Trinidad & Tobago 5 3 6 7 12 16 4 16 13 82 
17 Chile 7 5 5 1 16 7 14 11 14 80 
17 Dominican Rep. 9 12 17 2 10 12 9 3 6 80 
19 Bolivia 6 1 9 15 3 18 5 5 3 65 
20 Belize 4 2 20 4 20 3 1 2 5 61 
21 Barbados 1 6 4 9 1 4 6 7 7 45 
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Table 5. Regression Variable Codes and Definitions 
 
Regression 
Variable 
Codes 
 
Description of Variable 
DEBTX Total debt service as % of exports 
FMPOP Ratio of females to males in population 
FSHLF Female share of labor force 
GR Growth rate of per capita GDP in $1995 
GRGOV Growth rate of total (real) government expenditures 
INVGR Growth rate of gross fixed capital formation 
MFGVA Manufacturing value-added as % of GDP (Annual 
growth rate for manufacturing value added based on 
constant local currency) 
RELMORT Male to female mortality rates, relative to reference 
population (Sweden) 
RSENROLL Ratio of female to male gross secondary school 
enrollment 
SERVVA Services value-added as % of GDP (Annual growth 
rate for services value added based on constant local 
currency) 
TRADE 
 
Sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of GDP 
XGR Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services 
based on constant local currency 
 
Table 6. Panel Data Results, LAC, 1970-2000 
Fixed Effects, GLS 
 
Dependent Variable: d(F/M Population Ratio) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                 Eq. 1                    Eq. 2           
______________________________________________________________________________________                   
d(FMPOP(-1))  0.958          0.962    
 (59.54)***       (55.66)***         
GR   -0.001               
   (2.585)***     
INVGR            0.001             
          (0.87)                
XGR             -0.001    
                                      (0.67)  
d(MFGVA)             0.051           0.023   
             (2.50)**          (2.51)***   
d(SERVVA)                0.022          0.011   
                 (1.92)**         (1.04)   
d(TRADE)                0.003         -0.001   
              (0.27)          (0.26)    
d(DEBTX)            -0.002           -0.02   
             (0.43)           (0.28)   
d(FSHLF)  0.441           0.470   
             (1.57)          (1.68)*   
GRGOV               0.034          0.034      
           (6.45)***         (6.42)*** 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
N                  332                         319   
Adj. R2               0.953          0.950                               
Breusch-Godfrey              0.854                   1.392   
              (p=.43)                (p=.25)  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) indicates p<0.01, a double asterisk (**) p<0.05, 
and a single asterisk (*) p<0.10.   
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Table 7. Panel Data Results, LAC, 1970-2000 
Fixed Effects, GLS 
 
Dependent Variable: d(Ratio F/M Gross Secondary School Enrollment Rates) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                 Eq. 1           Eq. 2          
_______________________________________________________________________________________________                   
d(RSENROLL(-1)) 0.081          0.079   
 (0.47)          (0.69)         
GR   0.0002               
   (0.97)        
INVGR        0.0003             
          (2.84)***                
XGR             -0.0007    
                                      (2.12)**  
d(MFGVA)             0.081                   0.072   
              (4.34)***         (3.15)***   
d(SERVVA)  0.018         0.034   
   (0.14)         (2.26)**   
d(TRADE)  -0.001        -0.0001   
   (3.14)***     (1.61)*    
d(DEBTX)           -0.010          -0.011   
             (1.06)          (1.30)   
d(FSHLF)            0.013           0.005   
             (0.03)           (0.12)   
GRGOV               -0.001           0.002      
           (0.59)           (0.65) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N                  313                        299    
Adj. R2            0.106          0.166  
Breusch-Godfrey               1.006          1.169                          
              (p=.37)                 (p=.31)  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) indicates p<0.01, a double asterisk (**) p<0.05,  
and a single asterisk (*) p<0.10.   
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Table 8. Panel Data Results, LAC, 1970-2000 
Fixed Effects, GLS 
 
Dependent Variable: (F/M Adult Mortality Rates relative to Swedish Ratio) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                 Eq. 1           Eq. 2           
______________________________________________________________________________________                   
d(RELMORT(-1)) 0.763           0.749   
 (14.46)***         (12.12)***        
GR   0.0001                
   (6.64)***      
INVGR           0.001            
          (0.98)                
XGR             0.001    
                                      (0.90)  
d(MFGVA)             -0.011         0.004   
              (1.59)          (0.74)   
d(SERVVA)  0.005         0.017  
   (0.38)         (3.32)***   
d(TRADE)  0.001       -0.0002   
   (0.26)          (0.07)    
d(DEBTX)            0.003          0.002   
             (4.84)***         (2.74)***   
d(FSHLF)             -0.126          -0.180   
             (1.99)**                  (2.47)**   
GRGOV  -0.002          -0.002      
           (2.91)***         (2.29)** 
  
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N                   335                        321       
Adj. R2                0.792           0.766                                
Breusch-Godfrey               2.561                      0.764   
             (p =.04)                  (p=.57)   
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. A triple asterisk (***) indicates p<0.01, a double asterisk (**) p<0.05, 
and a single asterisk (*) p<0.10.   
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Table 9.-Summary of Regression Results 
 
 FMPOP RSENROLL F/M 
RELMORT 
 Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.1 Eq.2 
GR —*  +  +*  
INVGR  +  +*  + 
XGR  —  —*  + 
MFGVA +* +* +* +* — + 
SERVVA +* + + +* — +* 
TRADE + — — —* — — 
DEBTX — — — — +* +* 
FSHLF + +* + + —* —* 
GRGOV +* +* — + —* —* 
 
  Note: * indicates significance at the 10 percent level or better. 
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Figure 1. Partial Correlation between Change in Female Relative Well-Being 
and Growth GDP, 1970-2000 
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Note: Nearest neighbor (LOESS) fit (degree = 1.0, span=0.4). 
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 APPENDIX A 
 
Indicators of Gender Equity in Well-Being 
 
In the selection of these indicators, I make a distinction between flow variables and stock 
variables. The former represent a snapshot at a moment in time of gender relative well-being, 
while the stock variables are measures that represent the cumulative effect of gender bias in well-
being. (All indicators are measured so that a positive value indicates an increase in gender equity). 
 
1) Health Indicators  
 
The Ratio of Females to Males in the Population  
 
I rely on the number of females per 100 males in the population as an indicator of health as 
well as female social status, following Saith and Harriss-White (1999) and others.1 This can be 
considered a stock variable (rather than a flow) since it summarizes cumulative gender inequality 
as it has operated over a long period of time. In 2000, the ratio of females to males globally ranged 
from a low of 52 (United Arab Emirates) to a high of 117 (Latvia), with a global unweighted mean 
of 101.2.2 The causes for this variation are complex and include both biological and social 
determinants. In general, women’s natural advantage in longevity is offset to varying degrees by 
their lower social status.  
 
The ratio varies over the life cycle. Male birth rates exceed those of females by roughly 
five percent at birth due to biological factors, but female survival is higher from the fetal stage 
forward, if females and males are given similar care. This is explained by female resistance to 
diseases in infancy and differences in sex hormones in adolescence, which leads to higher 
mortality rates for males up to the age of 30. At that point, the ratio becomes balanced. But beyond 
this stage, if females are not severely disadvantaged, their survival rates exceed males’ up to 
menopause, causing the population ratio to favor females. As fertility rates decline and populations 
live longer, female relative ratios would likely lead to a higher share of women than men in the 
population since women usually outlive men. Operating in the opposite direction, there are a 
growing number of female abortions, as sex-selective abortion becomes more commonplace 
(Clarke 2000). Falling ratios may also be due to excess female mortality, gender inequities in 
access to resources for female children, including health care and nutrition, female-intensive out-
migration, and female-intensive violence (See Clarke 2000 on spatial geographic distribution of 
men and women as mobility of women changes).  
 
In societies where males are seen as socially and economically more valuable, or women 
are unable to exert sufficient power to protect female children on an equal basis with male 
children, we would expect a lower ratio than where greater equity is evident. A movement toward 
a higher ratio can be interpreted as a higher female quality of life or greater equity in well-being, 
though the exact chain of causality is not revealed in the indicator. In this sense, the variable is a 
rough proxy for the complex social dimensions of gender inequality. One of the challenges of 
using this variable is that a rising ratio, beyond a threshold ratio, may be due to male disadvantage, 
resulting from violence, war, or greater male use of alcohol and drugs, for example. That threshold 
ratio is not easy to determine since factors that influence mortality and life expectancy vary over 
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time. This problem exists with a variety of the variables used in this analysis, such as education 
ratios, where female education exceeds male education for some countries. Theoretically, we 
might want to develop a method of calculating indicators so that female well-being that exceeds 
males’ is not counted as a social “good.” In practice, only one of the countries in our sample has a 
female to male population ratio that is noticeably high (Barbados at 107), and it is about equivalent 
to the European average of 106, where life expectancies are very high.  
 
Ratio of Adult Male to Female Mortality Rates 
 
Adult male mortality rates (measured per 1000 persons) generally exceed female rates due 
to a variety of factors, including a higher incidence for males of such behaviors such as alcohol 
and tobacco consumption and violence. The gap between male and female mortality rates will be 
smaller, however, if women have less access to health care or food, if maternal health care 
provision is lacking, and if mortality from domestic violence is severe. In contrast to the 
population ratio, which captures differences in treatment of the young, this measure focuses on the 
adult population, although in some sense, it reflects cumulative discrimination since women’s 
health status in adulthood may be more compromised than men’s if treated unequally in earlier 
years. Gender bias is inferred by contrasting the male to female mortality rate with that of a 
reference developed country population. Following Svedberg (1996), I use Sweden as the 
reference population.3 This method is used as a way to sort out the biological factors that lead to 
gender differences in mortality rates from those that are behavioral. A ratio below 1 indicates 
country-specific gender bias relative to the reference population.  
 
Fertility 
 
Measures of female fertility (average number of live births per adult female) are an indirect 
measure of women’s well-being. Excess fertility frequently points to women’s lack of control over 
reproductive decisions, and reflects stress on women’s health, both through the physical cost of 
child-bearing and nurturing in early years, as well as in the labor time required to care for 
additional children. (In the latter regard, this can also therefore be considered a variable that 
measures access to resources. As women spend more time in the care of children, there is less time 
available for activities that generate income). A decline in fertility is considered to be an indicator 
of improvement in women’s quality of life, reflecting improvements in their agency. 
 
2) Education 
 
There is intrinsic benefit to women's education beyond income-earning possibilities, in that 
it leads to women’s enhanced understanding of the array of choices they may face, as well as their 
agency to change inequitable situations. I use three measures of relative educational attainment—
secondary enrollment rates, youth illiteracy, and total educational attainment. These are discussed 
in further detail below.  
 
Ratio of Female to Male Gross Secondary School Enrollment Rates  
 
The gross ratio of female to male secondary enrollment rates is a flow variable. It tells us, 
at a given point in time, what percentage of female children of secondary school age are enrolled 
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relative to the male rate in the same age group. This variable reflects treatment of females relative 
to males, indicated by society’s relative willingness to invest resources in their education in the 
current period. There are limitations on the ability of this variable to reflect gender inequality since 
these data do not take account of past discrimination against women in access to education. 
Further, because this is a gross (not net) ratio, it does not account for gender differences in drop-
out rates.4   
 
 
Ratio of Male to Female Youth Illiteracy Rates 
 
The ratio of male to female illiteracy rates for those aged 15-24 is used in this analysis to 
capture gender differences in well-being. The literacy rate, defined as the ability of a person to 
read and write, with understanding, a short simple statement on everyday life, is often frowned on 
as an indicator. This is because, frequently, the characteristic is self-reported and, there are cross-
country differences in the literacy criterion. While that weakness is difficult to overcome, it is 
attenuated in this case, since we are measuring ratios of male to female rates, rather than absolute 
levels of attainment. I use this variable in addition to the variable on secondary school enrollment 
because it captures a threshold of empowerment that can lead to improvement in status and 
bargaining power. This is also a flow variable. 
 
Ratio of Female to Male Total Average Years of Educational Attainment 
 
Another measure of education used here is the ratio of women’s to men’s total educational 
attainment of those over 15. This is a stock variable in that it gives information about older 
members of the population and summarizes past discrimination. It provides further breadth in our 
understanding of gender equity, since it includes measures of schooling beyond basic levels. One 
might argue that in increasingly industrialized societies, higher levels of educational attainment are 
necessary not only as a means to develop the mental skills to make choices, but also to provide 
access to labor markets. 
 
3) Access to Resources 
 
Access to resources is influenced by a person’s ability and agency to engage in productive 
activity. That access may occur directly, via the generation of earnings, or indirectly, if outside 
work options influence a woman’s bargaining power within the household, leading to a gender-
enabling redistribution of household resources. Education does not insure access to material 
resources. Therefore, a separate set of indicators is required to capture this aspect of well-being.  
 
The gap between education and access to resources is in part explained by pervasive job 
discrimination, with women paid significantly less than men on average, after accounting for 
gender differentials in productivity. This may be the result of employer behavior in non-
competitive markets (Black and Brainerd 2002). There is also evidence that the effect of job 
segregation, with women over-represented in “mobile” industries or flexible jobs, is low 
bargaining power vis-à-vis employers relative to men, with the result that wage gaps remain wide, 
even as educational gaps close (Bhattacharaya and Rahman 1999; Seguino 2000c; Berik, Van der 
Meulen Rodgers, and Zveglich 2002).  
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Measuring access to resources, while necessary, is complex.  Data on job segregation and 
pay differentials would have been preferred, but these are sparse. I therefore rely on labor market 
data, which provides a proxy for access to income, although in an imprecise way. There is no 
single measure that can capture labor market outcomes, in part due to the complexity of gender 
differences in labor market outcomes. It is also dangerous to rely on a single indicator since across 
countries, variables may be collected or measured differently5 and thus I include three measures of 
access to resources, all related to labor and labor market outcomes.  
 
Female Share of the Labor Force 
 
Labor force comprises all people who furnish labor for the production of goods and 
services at any time during a specified time period, and thus includes both the employed and 
unemployed. It covers work that is for pay and not for pay (e.g., subsistence agriculture). Even if 
providing unpaid labor, women’s contribution to economic well-being of the household via their 
productive labor can improve their status within the family and society. Berik and Bilginsoy 
(2000), for example, provide convincing evidence for Turkey that women’s participation rate in 
unpaid labor activities is a good measure of their economic value, perhaps related to the 
importance of female labor in agriculturally-based economies. This then is a broad measure of 
women’s ability to engage in productive activities, but it may overstate their well-being for several 
reasons. First, the status conveyed by productive activity may differ from country to country. 
Second, countries differ in the criteria adopted to determine whether workers, particularly unpaid 
family workers on farms, are to be counted among the economically active. Also, the lower bound 
on age of workers to be considered economically active differs from country to country.  
 
Female share of employment 
 
Female share of employment should be closely related to female share of the labor force, 
but this variable differs in some important respects. The data on employment refer to labor in paid 
employment or self-employment, for one or more hours a week. The employed include workers 
who 1) are temporarily laid off, 2) are not at work due to illness or other contingency, and/or 3) are 
on leave, with or without pay, but who nevertheless retain a formal attachment to their job. 
Because this variable reflects gender differences in unemployment, which can reduce household 
bargaining power, it captures an aspect of well-being not captured in the female share of the labor 
force. It is, though, not a precise measure of unemployment or access to income due to differences 
in measurement.  
 
Ratio of male to female unemployment rates  
 
Sen (1990a) and others focus on women’s paid labor as a measure both of their value and 
their bargaining power. Specifically, access to income is assumed to improve women’s bargaining 
power since the cost of leaving a job or a relationship is reduced as they gain access to independent 
sources of income. Moreover, women’s access to income can have important effects on the ability 
to provide material resources for themselves and their children that male members may not provide 
with their income. This can lead to an increase in women’s ability to affect the distribution of 
resources within the family, and also the distribution of unpaid labor time between women and 
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men. Unfortunately, I lack sufficient time-series data to differentiate between paid and unpaid 
labor, or on relative female to male wages. I therefore use the ratio of male to female 
unemployment rates, which generally refers to paid employment. There are differences in the way 
that countries measure this variable as well, with Anglophone Caribbean economies, for example, 
including discouraged workers among the unemployed (Seguino 2002b). This is a more accurate 
measure of unemployment since it counts persons who might otherwise be recorded as non-labor 
force participants if they do not have a job and have given up looking for work—even if they 
desire a job.   
                                                 
1
 This measure is used in place of life expectancy data, which are based on model life tables rather than real data. A 
weakness of the latter approach is that the tables are estimated from data that are often difficult to verify, given the 
underreported number of infant deaths (Bardhan and Klasen 1999). Moreover, that variable does not capture age-
specific differences in mortality due to gender discrimination. 
 
2 Author’s calculations from World Development Indicators, 2002. The mean is unweighted and is not significantly 
different from the unweighted median. Clarke (2000), using data from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook 
(1997), found for 1995 an average ratio of  females to 100 males of 106 for developed economies, 107 for the Europe 
region, and 111 for Eastern Europe (the latter the highest globally).  
 
3 For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see Agnihotri (1999). 
 
4
 Data on net enrollment rates would have been preferable but the large number of missing observations for the set of 
countries studied here made this infeasible. 
 
5
 For example, some data are obtained from workers 15 and older, while others count workers 12 and over. Data may 
be drawn from establishments with differing minimum sizes (e.g., 5 vs. 10 workers). Some countries include only 
civilians, while others include military in employment data. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B.1. Sample Countries 
Argentina 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
 
Table B.2. List of Gender Well-Being Variables, Definitions, and Sources 
 
Variable 
Category 
Variable   
Description of Variable 
Source 
Health F/M 
Population 
Ratio of females to males in 
population 
WDI 
 Relative F/M 
Mortality 
Ratio of adult female to male 
mortality rates per 1000 
(probability of dying between the 
ages of 15 and 60), relative to 
reference population (Sweden) 
WDI 
 Fertility Female fertility rate WDI 
Education F/M Secondary 
School 
Enrollment 
rate 
Ratio of female to male gross  
secondary school enrollment 
WDI 
 F/M Youth 
Illiteracy Rate 
Ratio of female to male youth 
illiteracy rate (15-24) 
UN Common 
Database (from 
UNESCO) 
 F/M Total 
Average Years 
Education 
Ratio of female to male average 
years of total education 
Barro and Lee 
2000 
Labor market 
access and 
income 
Female Share 
of Labor Force 
Female share of labor force WDI 
 Female share 
of Total 
Employment 
Female share of employment ILO 
 
 Ratio F/M 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Ratio of female to male 
unemployment rates 
ILO 
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